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Of Nazis, Americans, and Educating Against
Catastrophe
ERIC L. MULLER†
INTRODUCTION
Robert Jackson‟s Convocation Address on the occasion
of the University of Buffalo‟s Centennial was odd in one
respect: it presented a thesis that it did not try to support.
Jackson‟s argument at the outset of his speech was hardly
surprising in a university setting: “[I]t is my conviction that
improvement through education offers the last clear chance
of civilization to avoid catastrophe.”1 A moment later he
spoke generally of the “glorification of war and the warrior”2
in western learned culture and, intriguingly, characterized
war as a professional failing: the machinery that would
prevent war, he argued, “always broke down when the
stress came because its peace professions were superficial
while its background of war psychology was deep and
permanent.”3
But these were his last words clearly relating to
education in the address. He quickly moved on to a different
matter: the utility of the Nürnberg trials in instilling and
enforcing norms of peace in international law.4 To give an
† Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor in Jurisprudence and Ethics,,
University of North Carolina School of Law, and Director, Center for Faculty
Excellence, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Thanks to John
Barrett, Bernie Burk, Robert Burt, Joe Kennedy, Fred Konefsky, Abby Muller,
and Thorin Tritter for helpful comments on drafts of this Essay.
1. Robert H. Jackson, Address at the University of Buffalo Centennial
Convocation, October 4, 1946, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 283, 284 (2012).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 285.
4. Id. at 287 (“The long-range significance of the Nurnberg trial lies in the
effort to demonstrate or to establish the supremacy of law over such lawless and
catastrophic forces as war and persecutions, and to clarify and implement the
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account of Nürnberg was no doubt pressing in his mind on
October 4, 1946; the guilty verdicts against eighteen of the
twenty-one defendants were just three days old, and the
whole world was awaiting the hangings of eleven of the
convicts.5 Jackson surely is not to be faulted for failing to
reason his way, in the space of three days, from the example
of the Nürnberg trials all the way to a comprehensive
account of how “improvement through education” might
enhance the protection of minorities. But for a speech at a
major research university‟s centennial celebration, delivered
in academic regalia, Jackson‟s address was curiously silent
on the message about education that it promised.
Nearly five years later, Justice Jackson came back to
Buffalo to deliver a major address at the University of
Buffalo Law School. Same setting, similar expectations—
and a similar silence. Jackson was typically eloquent in
sketching what he called the “American dilemma”6 in which
the domestic legal system is called upon to reconcile claims
for security and liberty without “los[ing] our heritage.”7
Jackson described the problem beautifully, illustrating it
with historical episodes including the United States
Supreme Court‟s 1944 decision upholding the government‟s
forced removal of tens of thousands of American citizens of
Japanese ancestry from the West Coast in the spring of
1942.8 But again, this time in a room full of lawyers and law
students, he edged away from the question of education‟s
role in the process of reconciling values. “It is customary,”
said Jackson at the very end of his address, “to tell students
how urgently these great issues challenge them, and how
law for the practical task of doing justice to offenders, and for the academic task
of setting straight the thinking of responsible men on these subjects.”).
5. Only ten would be executed on October 16, 1946; Hermann Göring
cheated the hangman by committing suicide the night before his appointment at
the gallows. Dana Adams Schmidt, Guilt Is Punished, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1946,
at 1.
6. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L.
REV. 103, 117 (1951).
7. Id. at 115.
8. See id. at 115-16 (evaluating Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944)).
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soon they will have to face the greatest challenge of history[,
but] I forbear such extravagances.”9 If his audience of
lawyers-in-training—and their trainers—were to learn a
few of the skills of a “peace profession,” to use Jackson‟s
turn of phrase,10 they were not going to learn them from
Jackson.
The moment is ripe for consideration of Jackson‟s
suggestion of a role for education in tempering the excesses
of a war mentality. We have recently seen high-ranking,
prestigiously educated government lawyers help develop
and defend interrogation techniques for detainees that can
fairly bear the label of torture.11 These lawyers have not,
thus far, been meaningfully called to account. This
experience suggests the need for greater attention in legal
education to matters of principle and conscience, and
perhaps some study of moments in the history of the legal
profession when lawyers have served causes of great
injustice. At the same time, our anemic economy is placing
strong pressure on law schools to produce graduates who
are ready for the pragmatics of law practice.12 This reality
pushes us in a rather different direction.

9. Id. at 117.
10. I do not mean to suggest that Jackson himself understood the practice of
law to be a “peace profession.” Indeed, Jackson‟s 1945 vote—the necessary
fifth—to uphold the decision of the Illinois bar to deny a law license to a pacifist
conscientious objector implies that Jackson did not see lawyers as agents in a
campaign of resisting the excesses of war. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561
(1945). An interesting question lurks here as to why Jackson, openly advocating
for legal processes to restrain and temper the instinct to war, would have
approved of a state bar association‟s decision not to license a pacifist. But that is
a biographical question about Jackson himself that is outside the scope of this
Essay.
11. I refer, of course, to John Yoo and Jay Bybee of the Bush Administration‟s
Office of Legal Counsel. See, e.g., Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Gen.
of the U.S., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President of the U.S. (Aug. 1,
2002); Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the U.S., on
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President of the U.S. (Aug. 1, 2002).
12. See Alfred S. Konefsky & Barry Sullivan, There‟s More to the Law than
„Practice Ready,‟ CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 28, 2011, at A30; see also David
Segal, Law School Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BU1.
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This Essay offers some preliminary thoughts about how
we might fill in some of the blanks in Jackson‟s message
about the value of education as a counterweight to wartime
excesses. It pairs the stories of two relatively high-ranking
lawyers from different countries who oversaw the forced
removal of racially defined state enemies during World War
II, motivated not chiefly by virulent racism or
psychopathology but by something more uncomfortable to
acknowledge: the pressure of professional ambition. In the
key years between Jackson‟s two Buffalo speeches, both of
these men avoided public accountability for their acts of
repression. Both lived out the rest of their lives more or less
in peace. This Essay explores some of the all-too-human
forces that tend to lead societies—as they led Germany and
the United States—away from honestly reckoning with the
choices people make to harness their professional energies
to advance systems of repression. Indeed, it uses Jackson‟s
own ambivalent response to the wartime imprisonment of
Japanese Americans to illustrate those very forces. Finally,
this Essay takes up Jackson‟s call for deploying education
as civilization‟s last clear chance to avoid the catastrophic
mistreatment of minorities. It offers some tentative
thoughts about how legal education might provide a moral
grounding that would counterbalance the everyday
ambitions and administrative pressures that can lead the
members of a learned profession to sustain and nurture
systems of repression.
I. TWO DESIGNERS OF DEPORTATION: BENNO MARTIN AND
KARL BENDETSEN
I begin with a comparison of two men, a German and an
American, that will strike many as tendentious and heavyhanded, even outrageous. By the time the comparison is
complete, I hope to have persuaded at least some readers
that it is not, and that our instinct to recoil from the
comparison of German and American wartime excesses is
itself revealing of a force that undermines honest reckoning.
The comparison is of the activities of two influential
men in the winter and spring of 1942. The German was
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Benno Martin, the forty-nine year old chief of police in the
Bavarian city of Nürnberg.13 The American was Karl
Bendetsen, a U.S. Army colonel who was the commanding
officer of the Wartime Civil Control Administration
(“WCCA”), a unit of the Army‟s Western Defense Command
based in San Francisco.14 Both were trained in law. Martin,
born in 1893 in the southwestern German city of
Kaiserslautern, studied jurisprudence and law before the
First World War and resumed those studies after the war
ended.15 He received his juris doctorate in 1923 from
Erlangen University while on the staff of the Bavarian state
police, earning the highest grade on his terminal
examination.16 Bendetsen, born in 1907 in Aberdeen,
Washington, was a 1932 graduate of Stanford Law School
who left the private practice of law in 1940 to enter the
Army.17 The central point of comparison, however, is not
that both were lawyers. It is that early in 1942, both men
had authority to oversee the forcible removal and exile of a
racially defined internal enemy. In Martin‟s case, the enemy
was Jews.18 In Bendetsen‟s, the enemy was people of
Japanese ancestry.
A. Benno Martin and the Forced Removal of the Jews of
Franconia
Martin came from a Catholic family that for several
hundred years had sent its young men into civil service. 19
13. Little has been written about Benno Martin in English. The leading
source on him is a somewhat suspiciously sympathetic dissertation by Utho
Grieser, HIMMLERS MANN IN NÜRNBERG (1974).
14. The leading source on Karl Bendetsen is KLANCY CLARK
COLONEL AND THE PACIFIST (2004).
15. See Benno Martin, Lebenslauf (resumé),
Bundesarchiv Berlin (copy on file with author).

Aug.

DE

15,

NEVERS, THE
1935,

at 1,

16. See EDWARD N. PETERSON, THE LIMITS OF HITLER‟S POWER 248 (1969).
17.

DE NEVERS,

supra note 14, at 46, 52-53, 61.

18. We do not think of Jews as a “racially” defined group, but that is how
Nazi ideology defined Jews. See ANDRÉ MINEAU, THE MAKING OF THE HOLOCAUST:
IDEOLOGY AND ETHICS IN THE SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 103 (1999).
19. GRIESER, supra note 13, at 72.
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His sympathetic biographer argues that this family
tradition impelled him (and many other bureaucrats) to
serve every regime and facilitate its authority regardless of
the regime‟s politics.20 Martin‟s own political persuasion
was, however, decidedly nationalist and conservative, as
was his wife‟s. Their sympathies and votes during the
Weimar period were mostly for the reactionary DNVP
(German National People‟s Party).21
A dashing, broad-shouldered man well over six feet
22
tall, Martin joined the Bavarian state police in 1919.23
Within four years, at the young age of thirty, Martin was
promoted from within the ranks to an administrative
position in the political section of the central police office for
the Nürnberg-Fürth district in the city of Nürnberg.24 He
quickly distinguished himself for two things: a no-nonsense
law-and-order agenda and a single-minded focus on his own
advancement. Neither of these was uncomplicated in
Nürnberg, the home turf of one of the National Socialists‟
most rabid and unstable anti-Semites, Julius Streicher, and
Streicher‟s newspaper Der Stürmer.25 One of Adolf Hitler‟s
few true intimates, Streicher became the Nazi Party‟s
“Gauleiter,” or district boss, for the Franconia region in
1928.26 Martin‟s strategy in these early years was to protect
Streicher and his thugs from prosecution where he could
while simultaneously cultivating a relationship with Hitler
directly and with Heinrich Himmler, the commander of the
SS and an opponent of Streicher‟s within the Nazi Party.27
Martin did not become a party member until May 1,
1933, a few months after Hitler‟s seizure of power.28 He later
20. See id.
21. See id. at 74.
22. PETERSON, supra note 16, at 248-49.
23. See Martin, supra note 15, at 1.
24. See id.
25. ERIC G. REICHE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SA IN NÜRNBERG, 1922-1934, at
16-17 (2002).
26. See id. at 18, 83.
27. See GRIESER, supra note 13, at 62-66; PETERSON, supra note 16, at 251.
28. See Martin, supra note 15, at 2.
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explained that he waited until after Hitler came to power
because Streicher thought he would be more useful to the
Party outside it than within it.29 The ascension of the Nazis
to power led to reshufflings of local power across Germany,
and with the support of Streicher and Himmler, two
powerful men who mistrusted each other, Martin was
beautifully positioned to capitalize on it. In late September
1934, a few months after adding SS membership to his
resumé, Martin was appointed Nürnberg‟s police chief, a
position he held until mid-December of 1942.30
As an ever-rising star in the Reich, Martin might be
assumed to have been a National Socialist zealot and a
rabid anti-Semite. He appears to have been neither.
Through the 1930s he often used his authority to “moderate
or deflect the action of the party radicals, and in time to end
the power of his onetime protector, Streicher.”31 And
although Martin had no qualms about using a house
expropriated from a Nürnberg Jew as his official residence, 32
it is well documented that Martin deployed police power to
protect Nürnberg‟s Jews from the most extreme
degradations attempted by Streicher and his mob, warned
some Jews in advance of police actions, and helped some to
emigrate.33 It is not that Martin did not appreciate the
violent, even annihilatory nature of the Nazis‟ darker
aspirations; it is rather that he told himself that such things
would never actually come to pass.34 Perhaps the shrewdest
assessment of Martin came from Reinhard Heydrich, the
Chief of the Reich Main Security Office and architect of the

29. See GRIESER, supra note 13, at 77.
30. See Martin, supra note 15, at 2.
31. PETERSON, supra note 16, at 251.
32. See Edith Raim, Die Strafverfahren wegen der Deportation der Juden aus
Unter- und Mittelfranken nach 1945, in WEGE IN DIE VERNICHTUNG: DIE
DEPORTATION DER JUDEN AUS MAINFRANKEN, 1941-1943, at 178, 183 (2003).
33. See GRIESER, supra note 13, at 256-57; PETERSON, supra note 16, at 26768.
34. See GRIESER, supra note 13, at 256.
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plans to murder all of the Jews of Europe.35 In March of
1942, when SS chief Himmler was considering Martin for a
promotion, Heydrich wrote to him that while Martin‟s police
work in Nürnberg had been satisfactory at a technical level,
it was always in service of Martin‟s own personal ends
rather than National Socialism‟s.36
And yet, when the time came in late 1941 for Heydrich
to implement the plan for deporting Germany‟s Jews to the
East where they would be murdered, the task of organizing
and implementing that deportation for the Franconia region
fell to its police chief Benno Martin. And while Martin had
served as something of a buffer for Nürnberg‟s Jews against
the worst excesses of the November 1938 pogroms we know
as “Kristallnacht,”37 this was a forcible mass uprooting and
exile that left little room for fudging. The first deportation
came at the very end of November, 1941: one thousand Jews
were rousted from their homes, placed on trains, and
shipped off to Riga.38 This was a large operation with many
details to coordinate: a gathering point needed to be found
and prepared; trains needed to be secured; police personnel
needed to be deployed to gather, register, search, and guard
the deportees; and officials needed to be appointed to
examine and inventory the property the deportees tried to
bring with them.39 The official planning document dated
November 11, 1941, made clear that Martin “personally
oversaw the overall performance” of this operation and
assigned responsibility for its execution to a subordinate. 40
35. MICHAEL WILDT, AN UNCOMPROMISING GENERATION: THE NAZI LEADERSHIP
REICH SECURITY MAIN OFFICE 148-64 (Tom Lampert trans., Univ. of Wis.
Press 2009) (2003); see also infra note 102 and accompanying text.
OF THE

36. Heydrich‟s letter appears in translation in PETERSON, supra note 16, at
252, and in the original German in GRIESER, supra note 13, at 240.
37. See GRIESER, supra note 13, at 138-44; PETERSON, supra note 16, at 27071.
38. See ANDREJ ANGRICK & PETER KLEIN, THE “FINAL SOLUTION” IN RIGA:
EXPLOITATION AND ANNIHILATION, 1941-1944, at 205 (Ray Brandon trans.,
Berghahn Books 2009) (2006).
39. See CHRISTOPHER BROWNING, THE ORIGINS OF THE FINAL SOLUTION: THE
EVOLUTION OF NAZI JEWISH POLICY, SEPTEMBER 1939-MARCH 1942, at 383 (2007).
40. The order is quoted in GRIESER, supra note 13, at 262.
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He would later maintain that even here he sought to temper
the harshness of the blow, insisting that he had let it be
known he would not tolerate any “Schweinerei” (mischief),
had allowed the head of the Jewish community in Nürnberg
to decide who should be on the transport, and had chosen an
out-of-the-way (and therefore less stigmatizing) assembly
point for the Jews.41 Yet it is clear that Schweinerei did in
fact occur; police and SS men pocketed large amounts of
money that the Jews were supposed to be permitted to take
with them, and a huge “party of celebration” took place at
the assembly site after the trains pulled away, with
everyone enjoying and making off with the foods and luxury
items that the deportees had been forced to leave behind.42
While Martin remained police chief, four more
deportations of Franconia‟s Jews took place, on March 24,
April 25, September 10, and September 23, 1942.43 The
April 25th deportation left not from Nürnberg but from
Würzburg, another Bavarian city with its own Gestapo
branch that was answerable to Martin‟s office in
Nürnberg.44 The Würzburg branch carried out that
deportation under orders from Nürnberg and under the
watchful eyes of two observers sent by Martin.45 Martin was
not directly involved in that deportation, but did take the
time a few days after its completion to write a thank-you
note to Würzburg‟s police chief, the commander of the
“Schupo” (uniformed police), and the SS district leader for
their work in bringing it off.46

41. See id. at 262-63; PETERSON, supra note 16, at 273.
42. ERIC A. JOHNSON, NAZI TERROR: THE GESTAPO, JEWS,
GERMANS 400 (2000).

AND

ORDINARY

43. See GRIESER, supra note 13, at 264.
44. See Herbert Schott, Die ersten drei Deportationen mainfränkischer Juden
1941/42, in WEGE IN DIE VERNICHTUNG: DIE DEPORTATION DER JUDEN AUS
MAINFRANKEN, 1941-1943, supra note 32, at 73, 117.
45. Id.
46. See GRIESER, supra note 13, at 265.
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In total, about 4500 Jews were sent eastward in the
deportations undertaken under Martin‟s authority.47 Fewer
than one hundred survived.48
In December of 1942, Benno Martin was promoted to a
high-ranking position (“Höhere SS-und Polizeiführer”) in
the SS.49
B. Karl Bendetsen and the Forced Removal of Japanese
and Japanese Americans from the West Coast
Karl Bendetsen50 grew up in Aberdeen, Washington, a
gritty coastal mill town.51 All of his grandparents were
Jewish immigrants from Lithuania and Poland.52 His father
owned a successful clothing store in Aberdeen‟s small
commercial area.53 The young Bendetsen was “tall, goodlooking, and self-assured,”54 attributes that surely helped
him when he lied about his age and joined the Washington
National Guard at the age of fourteen.55
Bendetsen attended Stanford University, where he
completed the Reserve Officers‟ Training Course (“ROTC”),
and upon receiving his undergraduate degree he decided to
stay at Stanford for law school.56 He received his law degree
in 1932 and returned to his hometown to practice law. 57 He
mixed in the community, as one would expect a young
lawyer seeking business to do.58 Later in life, Bendetsen
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 242.
50. The family name was actually Bendetson. As an adult, Karl changed the
spelling to “Bendetsen,” abandoned Judaism, and invented a Danish lineage for
himself. See DE NEVERS, supra note 14, at 11, 304.
51. Id. at 44-46.
52. Id. at 44-45.
53. Id. at 46.
54. Id. at 51.
55. Id. at 50.
56. Id. at 52-54.
57. Id. at 54.
58. See id. at 55-56 (describing Bendetsen‟s early career and social life).
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would say that he had known “many, many Japanese.”59
Aberdeen was in fact home to a small Japanese community
of about eighty people,60 but there is no evidence that
Bendetsen was intimate with that community, or, for that
matter, that he held views about his Japanese immigrant
neighbors and their children that differed from what one
would expect at that time and place.
Bendetsen served as an officer in the U.S. Army
Reserve throughout the 1930s,61 but as the prospects of war
grew, his thoughts turned toward active duty. He gravitated
toward the Army‟s Judge Advocate General section because
of a personal contact he had there, accepting a permanent
appointment to that unit early in 1940 at the rank of
captain.62 He felt at first like little more than an errand
boy,63 but he soon found cases that would draw attention to
himself. He quickly impressed the Judge Advocate General
himself, Major General Allen W. Gullion.64 In early July of
1941, the Army reestablished the Office of the Provost
Marshall General with Gullion at the helm.65 Gullion
brought Bendetsen along as his assistant.66 The young Army
lawyer, suddenly promoted to the rank of major, was all of
thirty-three years old.67
Major Bendetsen‟s involvement in the mass removal of
Japanese and Japanese Americans after the Pearl Harbor
attack came in two distinct stages. The first stage lasted
from the end of December 1941 through mid-February 1942,
with Bendetsen functioning as something of an
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id. at 36.
61. Interview by Jerry N. Hess with Karl R. Bendetsen, in N.Y., N.Y. (Oct.
24, 1972) (conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library), available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bendet1.htm
[hereinafter
Bendetsen
Interview].
62.

DE NEVERS,

supra note 14, at 60.

63. Id. at 61.
64. See id. at 61-62.
65. Id. at 62.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 46, 62.
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intermediary among the various Army units developing the
policy of mass removal. The second stage began in midFebruary 1942 and lasted through early summer, with
Bendetsen, buoyed by yet another promotion, stepping into
the role of War Department factotum for the
implementation of the removal policy.
After the Pearl Harbor attack, officials across the
federal civilian and military bureaucracy recognized the
pressing need to develop a policy for controlling enemy
aliens around sites of strategic importance, but no one was
clear on who would be responsible for it. One candidate was
Lieutenant General John DeWitt, the commander of the
newly created Western Defense Command at the Presidio in
San Francisco.68 DeWitt‟s early position on the enemy alien
question was cautious; he thought the problem would best
be handled through civilian channels, and he did not believe
that any sort of mass roundup was advisable.69 Another
candidate was the Justice Department, which, on the basis
of the FBI‟s view that it had the enemy alien problem firmly
in hand, was even more restrained than DeWitt on these
questions.70 The third candidate was Karl Bendetsen‟s boss,
Provost Marshall General Allen Gullion, who was convinced
from the start that only an all-out program of forcibly
removing all people of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast would meet the political and military demands of the
moment.71
Operationally, General DeWitt was at the center of the
policy debate, but he was vacillating and ineffectual—“the
creature of the last strong personality with whom he had
contact,” as Roger Daniels put it.72 Gullion quickly saw that
the key to controlling the policy was controlling DeWitt, a
job he gave to Bendetsen. Starting around the first of the
68. ROGER DANIELS, CONCENTRATION CAMPS USA: JAPANESE AMERICANS
WORLD WAR II 36 (1971).

AND

69. Id. at 40.
70. See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES 25-33 (1983).
71. See DANIELS, supra note 68, at 40; DE NEVERS, supra note 14, at 82.
72. DANIELS, supra note 68, at 44.
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year, Bendetsen began an intense period of shuttle
diplomacy, traveling back and forth between Washington,
DC, and the Presidio, meeting repeatedly with General
DeWitt and with Justice Department officials in both
locations.73 But he was not a neutral broker in the
discussions; he was advancing Gullion‟s agenda of removing
and confining all of the West Coast‟s ethnic Japanese
population and divesting the civilian Justice Department of
influence over that agenda.74
The policy for which Bendetsen advocated was
unquestionably racial. In an early February 1942
memorandum on what he called the “Japanese problem,”
Bendetsen wrote that “[t]he vast majority of those who have
studied the Oriental mind assert that a substantial majority
of Nisei75 bear allegiance to Japan and . . . will engage in
organized sabotage, particularly, should a raid along the
Pacific Coast be attempted by the Japanese.”76 Just days
later, in a memorandum justifying the decision to uproot
every person of Japanese ancestry from their homes,
Bendetsen argued that “[t]he Japanese race is an enemy
race” and that while many members of the Nisei generation
had become “Americanized,” the “racial strains” tending
toward disloyalty were “undiluted.”77 Even decades later, at
the end of his life, Bendetsen insisted that the Japanese,
regardless of citizenship, were a race apart. He maintained
to an interviewer in 1972 that “the preponderance of all
persons of Japanese ancestry residing on the West Coast . . .
had largely concentrated themselves into specific and
readily identifiable clusters” where they “carried on their

73. See DE NEVERS, supra note 14, at 81-94, 98-109.
74. See DANIELS, supra note 68, at 40, 44-45; DE NEVERS, supra note 14, at 8188.
75. “Nisei” refers to the second generation of the Japanese community in the
United States, those born in the United States to immigrant parents. JAPANESE
AM. NAT‟L MUSEUM, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JAPANESE AMERICAN HISTORY 310 (2001).
76. DE NEVERS, supra note 14, at 103 (quoting Bendetsen memorandum of
February 4, 1942).
77. IRONS, supra note 70, at 59 (quoting Bendetsen memorandum of February
13, 1942).
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own culture [and] their own educational system” which
“generate[d] a separate way of life.”78
The details of Bendetsen‟s interventions in the
developing policy debate in January and early February of
1942 have been amply documented elsewhere and are not
important to the current account. The important point is
that he succeeded in steering the debate in favor of the
mass uprooting and exclusion of every person of Japanese
ancestry from the West Coast. The task was not easy; it
required him to outmaneuver high-ranking Justice
Department lawyers who maintained that the mass removal
of American citizens would be unconstitutional.79 But in the
end, he prevailed. On February 19, 1942, President
Franklin Roosevelt signed the executive order that
delegated to General DeWitt the power to declare military
zones within the Western Defense Command, from which he
could order the removal of civilians.80
Major Bendetsen might have thought that day that his
tasks on Japanese American exclusion were complete, but
he was mistaken. Having won the power to uproot more
than 110,000 people from their homes, General DeWitt
confronted the massive logistical problem of implementing
the program. He turned to the young and ambitious lawyer
who had helped bring the program into being. On March 11,
1942, DeWitt informed Bendetsen that he was delegating to
him the power to carry the President‟s executive order into
effect.81 It was to be Bendetsen‟s job “to organize a
bureaucracy to effect a mass evacuation and to construct
both temporary and permanent housing”82 for the entire
ethnically Japanese population of the West Coast. To
sweeten the deal, DeWitt conferred on Bendetsen yet
another promotion, this time to the rank of colonel, which

78. Bendetsen Interview, supra note 61.
79. See IRONS, supra note 70, at 62.
80. GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT 108 (2001).
81. See DE NEVERS, supra note 14, at 128.
82. Id.
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Bendetsen would note decades later “made [him] the
youngest in that grade at that time.”83
In this second phase of his involvement with mass
exclusion, Bendetsen shifted from the role of intermediary
and draftsman to the role of boss. On March 11, 1942,
DeWitt created the Wartime Civil Control Administration
(“WCCA”) within the Western Defense Command and
tasked it with the responsibility of overseeing the removal
of Japanese and Japanese Americans from the West Coast. 84
He placed Bendetsen at its helm.85 The young colonel threw
himself into the dizzying task. His pilot project, on March
30th, was at Bainbridge Island near Seattle: with a week‟s
notice, forty-five Japanese families consisting of ninety-one
aliens and 180 American citizens were placed on a ferry to
Seattle and then shifted to a train for the long trip to a new
confinement facility called Manzanar that was under
construction in the Owens Valley of California.86 The
Bainbridge Island deportation served as a template for the
process that Bendetsen repeatedly oversaw in the following
few months up and down the West Coast. The logistics of
the process were overwhelming. Bendetsen and his WCCA
were responsible for dividing the coast into exclusion zones
and districts, notifying and registering the affected
population, arranging for transportation, coordinating
efforts at dealing with property being left behind, selecting
and building confinement sites, and hundreds of other tasks
major and minor.87 By the time the spring of 1942 turned to
summer, much of Bendetsen‟s work was complete. He had
overseen the removal and confinement of more than 110,000
aliens and U.S. citizens on the basis of their ancestry.88
83. Bendetsen Interview, supra note 61.
84. DE NEVERS, supra note 14, at 128; LOUIS FISET, CAMP HARMONY: SEATTLE‟S
JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE PUYALLUP ASSEMBLY CENTER 49 (2009).
85.

DE NEVERS,

supra note 14, at 128.

86. See id. at 135; U.S. COMM‟N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 109 (1997) [hereinafter PERSONAL JUSTICE
DENIED].
87. See DE NEVERS, supra note 14, at 136-39, 153-54.
88. Id. at 143.
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In November of 1942, as Nürnberg police chief Benno
Martin was preparing for his promotion into the higher
ranks of the SS, the U.S. Army awarded Colonel Karl
Bendetsen its Distinguished Service Medal on the
recommendations of Gullion and DeWitt.89 Time Magazine,
reporting on the award, called Bendetsen‟s work “the
biggest moving job in U.S. history.”90
C. Calibrating the Comparison of Martin and Bendetsen
There is more of the stories of Benno Martin and Karl
Bendetsen to tell; I have as yet said nothing of how the men
were (and were not) later called to account for their wartime
conduct. Before comparing the processes of post-war
reckoning, however, I would like to pause for a few
clarifying comments about the comparison I‟ve already
drawn. Some readers, I suspect, might object to any
comparison of American and Nazi policy, because American
policy was not genocidal. The deprivations inflicted on Jews
at the eastern terminus of their deportations differed not
only in degree but also in kind from those visited on the
ethnic Japanese at the end of their eastward exile. Some
might see the very idea of comparing what Karl Bendetsen
did with what Benno Martin did as an exercise in
presentism, an unfair imposition on Bendetsen of the moral
sense of a later generation.
As it happens, however, comparing American with Nazi
policy is no anachronism; it is something that occurred to
people of Bendetsen and Martin‟s own era. For example, the
comparison occurred to—and roiled—Justices of the United
States Supreme Court during World War II. In June of
1943, the Court was presented with a constitutional
challenge to a dusk-to-dawn curfew that Bendetsen had
implemented (with General DeWitt‟s signature) for
Americans of Japanese ancestry in late March of 1942.91 The
Court upheld the curfew, but Justice Frank Murphy, in a
concurring opinion, worried that placing “no less than
89. Id. at 185.
90. Aliens: Medal for Moving, TIME, Nov. 30, 1942, at 22.
91. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1943).
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70,000 American citizens . . . under a special ban and
depriv[ing them] of their liberty because of their particular
racial inheritance[ ] . . . b[ore] a melancholy resemblance to
the treatment accorded to members of the Jewish race in
Germany and in other parts of Europe.”92 A year later,
Justice Roberts suggested such a resemblance in a case
presenting a constitutional challenge to the mass exclusion
and confinement of Americans of Japanese ancestry.93 In a
dissent from the Court‟s six-to-three decision to uphold the
program, Justice Roberts described the matter as “the case
of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to
imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his
ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry.”94 The term
“concentration camp” rankled the author of the majority
opinion, Justice Black, enough to provoke a dispute about
how apt the analogy was. “Regardless of the true nature of
the assembly and relocation centers” for Japanese
Americans, said Justice Black, “we deem it unjustifiable to
call them concentration camps with all the ugly
connotations that term implies.”95 And in a 1943 opinion
invalidating a compulsory flag salute for public
schoolchildren, Justice Jackson compared American efforts
to compel veneration of the flag to “the fast failing efforts of
our totalitarian enemies.”96
What is more, the comparison of American and German
deportations occurred to Benno Martin himself (or at least
to a lawyer representing him). Early in the 1950s, as Martin
defended himself in a German domestic court against
criminal charges arising from the deportation of Franconia‟s
Jews, Martin‟s lawyer sought to normalize the German
policy by comparing it to the contemporaneous American
program: “Pure evacuation measures,” he argued, “were
carried out neither solely against Jews nor solely by
92. Id. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring).
93. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
94. Id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 223 (majority opinion).
96. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). I thank
John Barrett for reminding me of this apt example.
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Germans; in fact the American General DeWitt, as High
Commander of the American West Coast, gathered 112,000
American citizens of Japanese ancestry living on the West
Coast in camps in the country‟s interior after the start of
the war with Japan.”97 The German court was not
persuaded by the analogy, but the point here is that the
idea of seeing commonality in the two systems of racial
deportation is not only not unfairly presentist; it is not
presentist at all.
Some might object to comparing Martin with Bendetsen
on the basis that the contexts of the two deportations were
different: Jews posed no threat to German security, while
the Japanese did pose such a threat to and in the United
States. This objection, which sounds faintly in the doctrine
of justification, is mistaken for at least two reasons. For one,
even if it is correct that the Japanese posed enough of a
military threat to the U.S. mainland in early 1942 to
support mass action against a domestic enemy,98 Karl
Bendetsen‟s program did not distinguish between Japanese
aliens and U.S. citizens. The only thing that connected U.S.
citizens of Japanese ancestry to the Japanese military
enemy was a belief in the idea of a racially-defined enemy of
the state, which was a notion with a German pedigree as
well. Second, this objection fails to recognize that in Nazi
ideology, Jews absolutely did pose a threat to German
security. As the Nazis saw things, Jews were responsible for
the “stab in the back” that undid Germany in World War I
and led to the punitive stipulations of the Versailles Treaty;
they were the core of Bolshevism, National Socialist
Germany‟s nemesis; they were responsible for the
hyperinflation that beset Germany in the Weimar years;99
97. 4 JUSTIZ
German).

UND

NS-VERBRECHEN 554 (1970) (author‟s translation from

98. There was ample evidence at the time that they did not. See Eric L.
Muller, Hirabayashi and the Invasion Evasion, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1354-68
(2010).
99. DAVID A. WELCH, JUSTICE AND THE GENESIS OF WAR 132 (1995) (“Hitler
blamed the Jews for Germany‟s stab in the back. . . . He blamed them for
bringing the scourge of Bolshevism into the world.”); Donald L. Niewyk,
Weimar, in 2 ANTISEMITISM: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PREJUDICE AND
PERSECUTION 759, 760 (Richard S. Levy ed., 2005) (“The participation of Jews in
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and young Jewish men assassinated Nazi officials or plotted
violence against Nazi offices in several different episodes in
the 1930s.100 To suggest that Americans rightly worried
about Americans of Japanese ancestry while Germans
arbitrarily victimized Jews is to misunderstand both the
American and the German frame of mind.
Some might recoil from comparing Bendetsen to Martin
on the basis that while Bendetsen was a cog in the
machinery of exclusion and confinement, Martin was a cog
in the exponentially more immoral machinery of mass
murder. This observation starkly distinguishes the two
systems, but less so the two men. Nothing in the historical
record suggests that Martin knew that the deportations he
was arranging in late 1941 and early 1942 were the first
steps of a march to mass murder.101 Martin was an
important regional police chief, but he was not party to the
planning that was taking place above his head, at the level
of a Heinrich Himmler or a Reinhard Heydrich, to turn the
object of the Nazi program for the Jews from forced
emigration to physical annihilation. He had no seat at the
table at the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, where a
range of upper-level Nazi bureaucrats acceded to Heydrich‟s
control over a program of industrialized genocide.102 His
work in Nürnberg in late 1941 and very early 1942 would
have given him no word of the gas chambers and crematoria
leftist and antiwar agitation was held as proof that that they had helped deliver
a „stab in the back‟ to the German army in 1918.”).
100. See Student Admits Killing Nazi Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1936, at 18
(recounting David Frankfurter‟s murder of Wilhelm Gustloff in Switzerland);
Germans Execute Hirsch, U.S. Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1937, at 1 (reporting
on the guillotining of Helmuth Hirsch for a plan to blow up the offices of Julius
Streicher‟s anti-semitic newspaper Der Stürmer); Reich Embassy Aide in Paris
Shot to Avenge Expulsions by the Nazis, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1938, at 1 (reporting
on Herschel Grynspan‟s shooting of Ernst vom Rath at the German Embassy in
Paris to avenge the Reich‟s exile of Polish immigrant Jews from Germany).
101. There is also no evidence in the historical record that Martin knew what
awaited the Jews deported on his watch in September of 1942, but it is hard to
believe that by that late point Martin would not at least have heard rumors of
mass killings. See BROWNING, supra note 39, at 391.
102. See MARK ROSEMAN, THE VILLA, THE LAKE, THE MEETING: WANNSEE AND
FINAL SOLUTION (2003) (summarizing and analyzing the Wannsee
Conference of 1942).
THE
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that were under construction or just coming on-line at
Chelmno, Belzec, Birkenau, and Sobibor.103 What Benno
Martin had to account for was designing and overseeing a
system that forced people defined as a racial enemy out of
their communities and into indefinite exile as vulnerable
wards of the state. That is also what Karl Bendetsen did. To
be sure, the American affirmatively knew something that
the German did not, namely that the deportees would not
face physical brutality or disease at their destinations and
would have at least some assistance in holding on to their
property. But Bendetsen could not absolutely count on that
in the future. What turns might American policy have taken
toward its Japanese American captives if, in the months
and years following the round-ups, the war had gone badly?
Whatever fate might have awaited Japanese Americans, it
would have been Karl Bendetsen‟s deportations and
imprisonments that placed them directly in harm‟s way and
made them an easy, captive target.104
103. See YAACOV LOZOWICK, HITLER‟S BUREAUCRATS 103 (Haim Watzman
trans., Continuum 2002) (2000) (“The death camps were still not fully
operational, so news of them could not reach either the Jews or the local
bureaucrats in the cities of Germany.”); Peter Fritzsche, The Holocaust and
Knowledge of Murder, 80 J. MODERN HIST. 594, 610-11 (2008) (“The precise fate
that awaited the evacuated Jews was not clear.”). But cf. GRIESER, supra note
13, at 266 (“Mit Recht weist Adler darauf hin, daß in Anbetracht seiner hohen
Stellung Martins Anwesenheit bei Anlässen vorauszusetzen ist, bei denen
Himmler unverhüllt über die Vernichtung der Juden sprach.”) (“Adler correctly
suggests that in light of Martin‟s high post, one must assume he was present at
events where Himmler spoke openly of the annihilation of the Jews.”).
104. From the opposite direction, some might object that comparing Martin to
Bendetsen is unfair to Martin, because the American was responsible for both
developing and implementing the entire mechanism of racial exclusion for the
nation, whereas Martin did not develop the program he implemented and
carried into execution in only one region. This objection has some force.
Bendetsen was the combined architect and project manager for the mass
removal and confinement of the entirety of the West Coast‟s ethnically Japanese
population. In terms of the scope of Bendetsen‟s competency, Adolf Eichmann is
probably a more apt analogue than Benno Martin. Eichmann was the project
manager of mass movements of human beings in a way that Bendetsen also
was, but Martin was not. However, because Eichmann knew that death awaited
the deportees, even directly witnessing some of the killing, he cannot serve as a
useful or fair analogue to Bendetsen. Martin is a much closer approximation.
For more on Adolf Eichmann‟s role in the “Final Solution,” see DAVID CESARANI,
BECOMING EICHMANN (2006); DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, THE EICHMANN TRIAL (2011).
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And yet, in the face of this, some will undoubtedly
continue to recoil from comparing the American and
German deportation planners. There is an undeniable sense
in the American popular mind that anything in the story of
Nazi Germany is of a different order from everything in the
American experience. To some extent, this may derive from
the continued sway in the American imagination of a
monolithic image of Nazi Germany that scholars long ago
discredited—one in which Germany was a crushingly
hierarchical terror state bent on genocide from the moment
the Nazis came to power.105 Americans‟ refusal to
contemplate Germany‟s racial deportations as an analogue
to America‟s may also reflect an offshoot of a broader
American exceptionalism—an emotional commitment to the
idea that whereas other countries‟ impositions on minorities
are deplorable, ours are debatable. On this account, the
refusal might serve as evidence of an American discomfort
with honest reckoning with its past if that reckoning entails
pointing a finger at individual wrongdoers, especially
powerful ones.106 Justice Jackson may have betrayed some of
that American discomfort with reckoning when he returned
to Buffalo for his 1951 speech. I will return to this question
after examining the processes of reckoning that unfolded for
Benno Martin and Karl Bendetsen.
D. Failures of Reckoning
Bendetsen and Martin lived somewhat parallel lives in
1942, starting the year overseeing the forced removal of
thousands and ending it with awards and promotions.
Within a few years, their paths diverged. At one level, those
105. See
RODERICK
STACKELBERG,
HITLER‟S
GERMANY:
ORIGINS,
INTERPRETATIONS, LEGACIES 139 (1999) (supporting the existence of the
“monolithic image”). Much of the disassembly of the myth of a monolithic
genocidal terror state came from the scholarly debate in the 1970s and 1980s
between the so-called “intentionalists” and “functionalists.” See Henry L. Mason,
Implementing the Final Solution: The Ordinary Regulating of the Extraordinary,
40 WORLD POL. 542, 543-51 (1988) (summarizing the debate).
106. On the reluctance to condemn historical injustices, see, for example, Eric
L. Muller, Judging Thomas Ruffin and the Hindsight Defense, 87 N.C. L. REV.
757 (2009) (noting reluctance of scholars to condemn an influential nineteenthcentury jurist who was an abusive owner and trader of slaves).
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paths might look like nothing more than an illustration of
the axiom that history is written by the victors. In reality,
though, the lesson of their post-war lives is more ambiguous
than that.
At the end of the war, Benno Martin was captured by
Allied forces and imprisoned and interrogated at
Nürnberg.107 He was not among those prosecuted for war
crimes before the international tribunal at Nürnberg and
was transferred to German custody in 1948 for trial in the
country‟s domestic courts.108 In 1949, the state prosecutor
charged Martin with the crime of aiding and abetting a
state official‟s deprivation of liberty resulting in death.109
This triggered a four-year odyssey of trials, appeals,
retrials, and more appeals. In the end, Benno Martin
walked free, acquitted on the weakest and most implausible
of his grounds of defense.
In his first trial, the District Court for the NürnbergFürth district found Martin guilty and sentenced him to a
term of three years‟ imprisonment. The court rejected
Martin‟s contention that the deportations were legal under
German law because Jews had been defined as state
enemies, concluding that “[l]aws and decrees lack legal
status if they treat human beings as subhumans and deny
them basic human rights.”110 Martin claimed that he did not
know the deportations were illegal, but the court concluded
that as a senior bureaucrat, Martin “knew all about the
constantly more severe measures imposed on the Jews and
107. See Office of U.S. Chief Counsel for War Crimes, Interrogation Summary
No. 1510, Interrogation of Dr. Benno Martin, Mar. 14, 1947, microformed on
Nat‟l Archives & Records Admin., Record Group 238, Microfilm M1019, Reel 45,
Slide 29; Office of U.S. Chief Counsel for War Crimes, Interrogation Summary
No. 2917, Interrogation of Dr. Benno Martin, July 24, 1947, microformed on
Nat‟l Archives & Records Admin., Record Group 238, Microfilm M1019, Reel 45,
Slide 50.
108. See GRIESER, supra note 13, at 294.
109. In German, the charge was Beihilfe zur Freiheitsberaubung im Amt mit
Todesfolge. See Raim, supra note 32, at 184.
110. Henry Friedlander, The Deportation of German Jews: Post-War Trials of
Nazi Criminals, 29 LEO BAECK INSTITUTE YEARBOOK 201, 220 (1984). The court
decision that Friedlander summarizes can be found, in German, in 4 JUSTIZ UND
NS-VERBRECHEN, supra note 97, at 525-87.
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had to recognise that they would lead to their
destruction.”111 The court rejected Martin‟s defense that he
had acted under duress. It concluded that while Martin
could have left the details of the deportations to
subordinates, he chose to attend to them himself out of his
own free will.112 Finally, the court was not persuaded by
Martin‟s claim that he had involved himself in the
deportations only to protect the deported Jews from the
more brutal treatment they would have endured at the
hands of Nazi fanatics like Julius Streicher and Reinhard
Heydrich. In the court‟s view, Martin positioned himself
against Streicher and Heydrich out of “ambition and a
desire for status.”113
Martin appealed his conviction to the Bavarian Circuit
Court.114 The court reversed the conviction in 1950.115 While
deportation for murder would have been illegal under
German law, the court reasoned, deportation alone was
lawful in some circumstances.116 The Circuit Court
concluded that the trial court had not delved deeply enough
into the question of exactly what Martin knew about the
deportations; if he did not know that they were preludes to
murder, he would have lacked a criminal mental state.117 On
remand, in 1951, the District Court retried and acquitted
Martin on the ground suggested by the Circuit Court: he did
not know the deportations would lead to death and were
therefore illegal.118

111. Friedlander, supra note 110, at 220.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 220-21.
114 Id. at 221. The Bavarian Circuit Court opinion can be found in 4 JUSTIZ
note 97, at 588-616.

UND NS-VERBRECHEN, supra

115. Friedlander, supra note 110, at 221.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 221. The District Court decision can be found in 8 JUSTIZ
VERBRECHEN 465-505 (1972).
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The state‟s attorney appealed the acquittal, this time to
Germany‟s highest appellate court, the Bundesgerichtshof.119
In 1952, it reversed the trial court‟s acquittal, rejecting that
court‟s (and, implicitly, the Bavarian Circuit Court‟s)
approach to the question of what amounted to guilty
knowledge.120 Even if Martin did not know that the
deportations would lead to death, the Bundesgerichtshof
reasoned, Martin surely knew that “an entire people were
torn from their familiar surroundings only because of their
race.”121 That knowledge was enough to establish Martin‟s
criminal liability. Back the case went to the District Court.
Ruling in July of 1953, the District Court acquitted
Martin for the final time.122 It concluded that Martin, having
received a “classical and Christian education,” ought to have
known that deporting Jews was illegal.123 But, somewhat
incredibly, it concluded that Martin had participated in the
deportations only under duress, fearful that he would
himself be taken to a concentration camp or even killed if he
failed to obey orders.124 This basis for acquittal conflicted
embarrassingly with Martin‟s self-portrayal throughout all
of his trials and appeals as a kindly official who often took
steps to soften the impact of the Nazi racial policies on the
Jews and to reign in the more extreme elements of the Nazi
Party in Nürnberg. But the acquittal stuck. Benno Martin
left court a free man. He lived another twenty-two years,
dying in Munich in 1975 at the age of eighty-two.
While Benno Martin was facing his first trial in
Germany in 1949 after several years of detention by
American and then German authorities, Karl Bendetsen
was continuing to build his career in the United States. He
had left the Army in December of 1945 and joined a
119. Friedlander, supra note 110, at 221. The Bundesgerichtshof‟s decision can
be found in 8 JUSTIZ UND NS-VERBRECHEN, supra note 118, at 506-14.
120. Friedlander, supra note 110, at 221.
121. Id. at 221.
122. Id. at 221. The District Court‟s opinion can be found in 11 JUSTIZ UND NSVERBRECHEN 185-203 (1974).
123. Friedlander, supra note 110, at 221.
124. Id.
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management consulting firm in California, only to return to
Washington in 1948 to serve as a special assistant to
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal on budget matters.125
In 1949, he organized the office of General Counsel to the
U.S. Army and was the first to serve in the position.126
Army Secretary Gordon Gray then made known that he
wished to appoint Bendetsen as Assistant Secretary of the
Army.127 This was the first moment when Bendetsen‟s past
began to dog him, at least a little bit. Late in August of
1949, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit made national headlines128 when it condemned
aspects of the government‟s wartime treatment of Japanese
Americans as “cruel” and “inhuman” and scorned General
DeWitt‟s “doctrine of enemy racism inherited by blood
strain” as “an anthropological absurdity.”129 The court‟s
opinion galvanized those voices that were beginning to look
back critically on the program that Bendetsen had helped to
design and had operated. The National Democratic Party
geared up to oppose Bendetsen‟s nomination, and the
Japanese American Citizens League quickly announced its
opposition as well.130 The situation grew a bit more
uncomfortable for Bendetsen early in 1950, when a letter
critical of him by a Catholic priest in Los Angeles surfaced.
Father Hugh Lavery of the Catholic Maryknoll Mission
wrote that in overseeing the removal of Japanese Americans
from Los Angeles, Bendetsen had “showed himself a little
Hitler” who decreed that orphans had to be evicted even if,
in Bendetsen‟s words, “they have one drop of Japanese blood
in them.”131 Letters began to pour into the White House

125. Interview by Jerry N. Hess with Karl R. Bendetsen, in N.Y., N.Y. (Nov. 9,
1972) (conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library), available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/bendet2.htm.
126. Id.
127.

DE NEVERS,

supra note 14, at 242.

128. Nisei Citizenship Upheld on Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1949, at 5.
129. Acheson v. Murakami, 176 F.2d 953, 954, 957 & n.1a (9th Cir. 1949).
130.

DE NEVERS,

supra note 14, at 250.

131. Drew Pearson, The Merry Go-Round, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1950, at B15.
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urging President Truman not to make the appointment.132
Bendetsen allowed in a letter to the Army Secretary that he
was suffering “a most unhappy and frustrating
experience.”133 But in the end, the protests came to nothing,
and Bendetsen won Senate approval in February of 1950.134
He was forty-two years old.135
Two years later, Bendetsen‟s rise continued. When
Archibald Allen, the Under Secretary of the Army, resigned
to run for political office, President Truman nominated
Bendetsen to take his place.136 Confirmation this time was
swift and uncontested. The Senate confirmed him in early
May of 1952.137 As the German Bundesgerichtshof
announced that Benno Martin should be answerable for
“tearing an entire people from their familiar surroundings
only because of their race,” Karl Bendetsen, at age fortyfour, came to occupy the second-highest civilian position in
the U.S. Army.
He left that position late in 1952 to join the Champion
Paper & Fiber Company, a large paper and wood products
concern, as a consultant.138 Within three years he became
vice-president and general manager of its Texas division.139
By 1965, he became the company‟s chief executive officer. 140
He retired in 1972.141
The forced removal and imprisonment of Japanese
Americans disturbed Bendetsen‟s retirement in the 1980s. A
new generation of Japanese Americans, buoyed by the
successes of the civil rights and ethnic and racial pride
132.

DE NEVERS,

supra note 14, at 359 n.43.

133. Id. at 253 (quoting Bendetsen).
134. Id. at 255.
135. Id.
136. Bendetsen Named Under Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1952, at 12.
137. Bendetsen Confirmed, WASH. POST, May 7, 1952, at B12.
138.

DE NEVERS,

supra note 14, at 267.

139. Id.
140. Karl Bendetsen Dies; Internment Planner in 1942, WASH. POST, June 30,
1989, at C4.
141. Id.
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movements, began pressing in the 1970s for redress for
what they and their families had suffered during the war. 142
In 1980, Congress established the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians and charged it with
the duty to examine the justification for the program of
mass exclusion and incarceration that Bendetsen had had
such a large hand in engineering.143 Bendetsen was hostile
to the entire enterprise, calling the idea of financial
compensation a “raid on the [t]reasury.”144 But when he was
called as a witness at a public hearing, he defiantly refused
to concede that the program had been a mistake.145 It was
not an easy appearance for him. Accustomed to giving
orders and presiding over corporate board meetings, the
seventy-four year old Bendetsen was interrupted by boos
and hisses from the audience of former internees and their
descendants and supporters.146 While he tried to downplay
the significance of what he had earlier bragged was his
central role in conceiving and implementing the program,147
he stood by the view that “human nature” would have led
Americans of Japanese ancestry to join forces with invading
Japanese soldiers in 1942.148 The coverage of his testimony
in the national media was far from flattering.149 His
hometown newspaper speculated that Bendetsen “must

142. See generally ROBERT SADAMU SHIMABUKURO, BORN IN SEATTLE: THE
CAMPAIGN FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN REDRESS (2001) (summarizing the movement
for redress for prior generations of Japanese Americans‟ suffering that occurred
during World War II internment).
143. See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 86, at xvii.
144.

DE NEVERS,

supra note 14, at 9 (quoting Bendetsen).

145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 185.
148. IRONS, supra note 70, at 355.
149. See Ex-Officer Defends Japanese Camps, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1981, at A2;
Lee May, Japanese Confined for Own Good, Internment Leader Contends, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1981, at A20; Relocation Officer Defends WWII Act, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 3, 1981, §1, at 3; Ken Ringle, Architect of Relocation Prefers Case Stay
Shut, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1982, at A18; World War II Internment Is Defended,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1981, at B13.
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have wondered whether he was a defendant” in the eyes of
the commissioners questioning him.150
In 1983, the Commission issued its report. 151 It
concluded that the mass exclusion and imprisonment of
people of Japanese ancestry had been the unjust product of
racism, hysteria, and failed leadership.152 It recommended
an apology and redress payments for the surviving
victims.153 Karl Bendetsen was left privately fuming at the
repudiation of the policies he had nurtured and
implemented.154 Meanwhile, an editorialist in the San Jose
Mercury News predicted that however successful a life
Bendetsen had lived, “history . . . [might] treat him more
critically.”155
Bendetsen did not live to appreciate much more of the
unraveling of his reputation, however. He slipped into the
clutches of Alzheimer‟s disease in the mid-1980s and died in
1989 at the age of eighty-one.156 He was buried in Arlington
National Cemetery.157
II. JUSTICE JACKSON AND THE AVERSION TO RECKONING
Justice Jackson‟s two speeches in Buffalo bracketed an
important segment of the post-war lives of Benno Martin
and Karl Bendetsen. In 1946, Martin was in Allied custody,
being held for possible prosecution; Bendetsen was in the
private sector, working his way up the corporate ladder. By
1951, Martin was well on his way to ultimate exoneration,
having seen an early conviction reversed on appeal and then
an acquittal in the trial court on remand, and Karl
Bendetsen had shrugged off moderate public criticism to
150.

DE NEVERS,

supra note 14, at 9.

151. PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 86, at xvii.
152. Id. at 18.
153. See id. at 462-64.
154. See DE NEVERS, supra note 14 at 286.
155. Id. at 283 (quoting Wes Payton, Bendetsen Awaits History‟s Verdict on
Relocation, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 9, 1983, at 7C).
156. See id. at 291-92.
157. Id. at 292.
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assume the position of Assistant Secretary of the U.S.
Army. These were two key planners of wartime racial exiles
of civilians in Germany and the United States, and in the
five years between Justice Jackson‟s two speeches, neither
had been successfully called to account.
Justice Jackson predicted in 1946 that the Nürnberg
trials would prove significant in three ways: they would
“demonstrate . . . the supremacy of law over such lawless
and catastrophic forces as war and persecutions,”
“implement the law for the practical task of doing justice to
offenders,” and “set[ ] straight the thinking of responsible
men on these subjects.”158 They would, Jackson imagined,
unleash a wave of educative reckoning and cement the role
of law in restraining what Jackson called the psychology of
war.159 Yet the five years that followed saw little of the sort;
both American and German societies seemed more eager to
avert their gaze from past excesses than to learn from them.
If we look carefully at Justice Jackson‟s 1951 address,
we can see traces of the psychology that led away from
reckoning rather than toward it. He began near where he
had left off in 1946, reminding his listeners that the rule of
law and its “impersonal forces” were the only things “strong
enough” to protect the liberties of citizens.160 But he quickly
set the American experience in World War II apart from
that of every other combatant: unlike other nations,
Jackson said, we came through the war “without serious . . .
impairment of our system of ordered liberty under law.”161 It
should go without saying that the tens of thousands of U.S.
citizens forced from their homes and confined for years on
account of their Japanese ancestry might have quibbled
with Jackson‟s definition of a “serious impairment of our
system of ordered liberty.” At this point in his address,
Jackson was not considering the case of Japanese
Americans; he was making an observation about our
158. Jackson, supra note 1, at 287.
159. Id. at 285 (“[The political machinery‟s] background of war psychology was
deep and permanent.”).
160. Jackson, supra note 6, at 104.
161. Id.
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nation‟s having survived the war without the traumatic
upheaval in government structure that invasions,
bombings, and mass domestic mobilizations can trigger. In
this sense, his point is unassailable. But it is also
noteworthy for the blind eye it turned to a point of contact
rather than disjunction with the wartime failings of other
nations.
When Jackson, later in his 1951 address, turned
directly to the Japanese American wartime experience, his
inclination to place his country and its wrongdoers outside
the didactic scope of Nürnberg became clearer. He
presented the case of Korematsu v. United States162 as a
leading example of the difficult wartime challenges that
come before American courts—situations in which
government officials defend “[m]easures violative of
constitutional rights” with claims of military necessity that
are “not provable by ordinary evidence.”163 Jackson did not
equivocate on his view of the legal merits of the program of
“remov[ing] all persons of Japanese ancestry, including
native-born American citizens, from the west coast and
herd[ing] them into camps in the interior.”164 “It seemed to
me then,” Justice Jackson said in Buffalo in 1951, “and does
now, that the measure was an unconstitutional one.”165
A judge wishing to apply the teachings of Nürnberg—to
“demonstrate . . . the supremacy of law over such lawless
and catastrophic forces as war and persecutions,” as
Jackson put it in 1946166—might be expected to conclude
that the judiciary had the obligation to review and overturn
such a wartime measure. As Jackson noted in 1951,167 that
is just what Associate Justices Frank Murphy and Owen
Roberts voted to do in their Korematsu dissents.168 But
162. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
163. Jackson, supra note 6, at 115.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 115-16.
166. Jackson, supra note 1, at 287.
167. Jackson, supra note 6, at 115.
168. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting); id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Jackson did not join their opinions. Dissenting separately,
he instead reasoned that because the courts were
incompetent to evaluate the merits of the government‟s
claims of military necessity, they should decline to reach the
issue of the measure‟s legality and instead declare the issue
inappropriate for a civilian court‟s adjudication.169 Jackson
readily admitted that under his approach, “had the military
authorities attempted to enforce the measure by their own
force and authority,” rather than with a court‟s, it would not
be appropriate for a court to “attempt active interference.” 170
He conceded that what he had in mind came “close to a
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or recognition of a
state of martial law at the time and place found proper for
military control.”171
What a stunning position for an advocate of the rule of
law as a restraint on wartime excesses! Jackson admitted a
touch of discomfort with this position; he acknowledged in
1951 that none of the Justices‟ positions in Korematsu—
including his own—was “wholly satisfying.”172 But in
memorable language in the Korematsu dissent itself,
Jackson took comfort from the expectation that the
judgments of American military leaders could be restrained
by the will of the people:
If the people ever let command of the war power fall into
irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the courts wield no power
equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon those who
command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in the
past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of
173
their contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.

How odd. For the rest of the world, Justice Jackson
preached the rule of law as an agent of reckoning. Law
would accomplish the “practical task of doing justice to
offenders” and “set[ ] straight the thinking of responsible
169. See id. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
170. Jackson, supra note 6, at 116.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 115.
173. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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men.”174 For the United States, Justice Jackson was
prepared to trust these tasks to politics.175
Jackson was no Pollyanna; he did not pretend that the
“psychology of war” posed no challenges for the United
States. He simply maintained in 1951 that those challenges
lay ahead—in the growing threat of Communism—rather
than immediately behind.176 But here is the curious blind
spot177 in Jackson‟s vision: experience had already proven
this false.178 Politics had not been up to the task of
preventing the mass racial exile and incarceration of
Japanese Americans in 1942.179 Worries about “the moral
judgments of history” had not been large enough to stop
military officials in their tracks. And even as Justice
Jackson spoke, the American architect of exile and
incarceration, Karl Bendetsen, continued on his youthful,
meteoric rise to the top echelon of the Army.
What Justice Jackson presented was a form of
American exceptionalism, but there is little reason to think
that hesitating to condemn wrongdoers with the force of law
actually is a uniquely American instinct. Remember that
174. Jackson, supra note 1, at 287.
175. Nothing in the years between 1944, when Korematsu was decided, and
1951, when Jackson spoke at Buffalo, changed his mind. He said in his 1951
speech that he “[could] add nothing to [his] dissent” in Korematsu. Jackson,
supra note 6, at 116.
176. See id. (commenting on the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia).
177. But cf. John Q. Barrett, A Commander‟s Power, A Civilian‟s Reason:
Justice Jackson‟s Korematsu Dissent, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2005,
at 57 (arguing that Jackson‟s Korematsu dissent reflected a wise appreciation
for the wartime limits of the powers of the civilian judiciary).
178. For a related criticism of Justice Jackson‟s position in Korematsu, see
Dennis J. Hutchinson, “The Achilles Heel” of the Constitution: Justice Jackson
and the Japanese Exclusion Cases, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 455, 493.
179. Indeed, politics extended the length of the imprisonment of Japanese
Americans from early summer of 1944, when President Roosevelt‟s top military
and civilian advisors had come to believe the program could no longer be
justified, through November of 1944, when the President finally agreed to
rescind mass exclusion. Roosevelt did not wish an early announcement of the
end of mass exclusion to damage the chances of Democratic congressional
candidates on the West Coast in the November election. See ROBINSON, supra
note 80, at 216-23.
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the courts of West Germany exonerated Benno Martin for
deporting the Jews of Nürnberg. And this was no isolated
case: “Between 1950 and 1962 the West Germans
investigated 30,000 former Nazis . . . tried 5,426, and
acquitted 4,027.”180 That is an acquittal rate of seventy-five
percent. The perpetrators whose convictions stuck were
mostly the low-ranking thugs with blood on their hands; the
mid- and upper-level functionaries who set up and ran the
machinery of repression from their desks were most often
exonerated.181 Scholars debate the reasons, but the
continued presence of former Nazis in the West German
judiciary surely played a role, as did the geopolitical need of
the United States to bolster West Germany in the fight
against Soviet communism.182 For this latter reason,
American pressure on the West Germans to root out and
punish their Nazi malefactors largely evaporated in the late
1940s.183 With no external pressure to keep their gaze on
their uncomfortable past, most West Germans preferred to
look away.184 Benno Martin, his name cleared, returned
home and lived the last three decades of his life in peace.
III. EDUCATING AGAINST AMBITION
It would be useful at this rather bleak moment to recall
the promise of Justice Jackson‟s 1946 address—his opening
argument that “improvement through education offers the
last clear chance of civilization to avoid catastrophe.”185 In a
world where psychological and political forces and the
passage of time naturally tend to shift our attention away
180. REBECCA WITTMANN, BEYOND JUSTICE: THE AUSCHWITZ TRIAL 15 (2005)
(emphasis added).
181. See MARY FULBROOK, GERMAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AFTER
59-60 (1999).

THE

HOLOCAUST

182. See CESARANI, supra note 104, at 214, 333; FULBROOK, supra note 181, at
48-55; JEFFREY HERF, DIVIDED MEMORY: THE NAZI PAST IN THE TWO GERMANYS
267-333 (1997).
183. See, e.g., FULBROOK, supra note 181, at 48-55.
184. See, e.g., CESARANI, supra note 104, at 214 (“Everyone wanted to forget
the war, the atrocities, the Nazis.” (quoting Tuvia Friedmant)).
185. Jackson, supra note 1, at 284.
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from attributing responsibility for the excesses of war, can
education help to counteract those forces? Can education
strengthen our resolve to demonstrate the supremacy of law
over the excesses, including the persecutions, of wartime?
Like Justice Jackson, I answer that question
affirmatively, but I offer the somewhat comparable
bureaucratic careers of Karl Bendetsen and Benno Martin,
rather than the trials of the highest-ranking Nazi
perpetrators at Nürnberg, as a lesson. As a pedagogical tool,
a monster like Hermann Göring is not especially useful.
Most people rightly have a hard time seeing much of
themselves in him. Few of us come so tightly in the grips of
a philosophy of racial hatred as Göring; few rise to such
high levels of government power; and fewer still use that
power in such unambiguously evil ways. To hold Hermann
Göring out as an example of what not to be in life is to offer
little. Condemning him is morally essential but not
particularly morally instructive to the ordinary person.
Studying the lives of Karl Bendetsen and Benno Martin
is a different matter. Neither of these men, trained in law,
appears to have been a particularly extreme racist in the
context of his time and place. Neither stood at the pinnacle
of governing power in his country; both men were public
servants toiling at the upper level of their respective
bureaucracies. Each was able to tell himself a plausible
story about how much worse things would have been if a
more unscrupulous person had held his office. And yet each
set in motion the mass uprooting and physical isolation of a
vulnerable population.
What links the professional lives of these two lawyers is
not virulent racial hatred or extreme bloodthirstiness. It is
the warping influence of bureaucratic ambition. These were
two striving men. Although it is uncomfortable to defer to
the character analysis of a criminal like Reinhard Heydrich,
his assessment of Benno Martin seems corroborated by the
facts of Martin‟s life: what guided the Nürnberg police chief
in his career was most of all a desire to climb in rank and
prestige. Sometimes Nazi racial policies were stepping
stones for him; at other times, they appear to have been
stumbling stones around which he gingerly picked a path.
But the path was the thing, and he trod it, in the space of a
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decade, from the middling ranks of a city police force all the
way to the position of “Höhere SS-und Polizeiführer”
(Higher SS and Police Leader), for his entire region of
Germany.
The same was true for Karl Bendetsen. In a far shorter
time than Martin managed his ascent, Bendetsen rose from
captain to major to colonel, serving in the latter position, as
he liked to brag, as the youngest man in rank. Within six
months after the United States entered the war, Bendetsen
sat atop a unit of the Western Defense Command that was
more or less of his own creation, asserting near-complete
authority over civilians across a huge swath of the country.
And there can be no question that the springboard to all of
this was Bendetsen‟s own ambition—his willingness to
harness his lawyerly energies to a policy of racial isolation
and control that he knew the country‟s top civilian lawyers
and security officials thought unnecessary and illegal. When
Bendetsen received the Army‟s Distinguished Service Medal
in 1942, and then rose to the rank of second-highest civilian
official in the Army a decade later at the age of forty-four,
these accomplishments could only have seemed to him a
confirmation of his strategy of striving.
Anyone who has ever worked a desk job in an
organization should be able to recognize behaviors and
motivations of this sort. A chilling example of it comes from
Laurence Hewes, the regional director of the Farm Security
Administration (“FSA”) in San Francisco at the moment in
the spring of 1942 when Bendetsen‟s WCCA took charge of
the mass removal of Japanese Americans.186 Hewes
personally opposed the removal of Japanese Americans, but
was detailed by the Department of Agriculture to provide
support for it.187 He attended a mid-March meeting at which
Bendetsen explained to the assembled military and civilian
bureaucrats the enormous, logistically daunting program of
mass removal they were responsible for assisting.188 At the
end of the session, Bendetsen described the field
186. LAURENCE I. HEWES, JR., BOXCAR IN THE SAND 110 (1957).
187. Id. at 163.
188. Id. at 164-65.
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organization that would be required to bring the plan off.
He explained that within just three days, the Army would
be establishing forty-eight field stations from northern
Washington to southern Arizona to process the deportees,
and each of those stations would need an agricultural
staff.189 This was Hewes‟s department. Hewes was shocked;
he asked himself: “How on earth could [he] find forty-eight
crews to staff these offices, much less get them to their
stations in three days?”190 Bendetsen patronizingly told the
assembled administrators that he understood that they
would not be able to accomplish it, but that they should
“just get [their] people on the job as fast as [they could.]”191
It irked Hewes that this Army official doubted the ability of
a civilian administrator to get the job done. “By God,” he
thought, “I‟ll show the Army something about
administration!”192 Hewes immediately worked the phones
and lined up men from as far away as Boise, Salt Lake City,
and Denver to be transferred westward to man the
stations.193 Within hours, he was able to go back to
Bendetsen, ahead of schedule, for air travel requisitions for
his crews.194 Hewes saw it as a “game . . . of competing with
the Army,” and took pleasure from the fact that “at a few
places we were ahead.”195
How little it took to turn Hewes from a reluctant
participant in a program he found distasteful to a go-getter:
a bit of military-civilian competition, a patronizing comment
from a rival bureaucrat, and a desire to be seen as
exceeding expectations. This is an unusually clear recitation
of a mechanism that the historiography of the Holocaust
has positioned as a chief explanation for the involvement of
so many ordinary people in the Nazi-sponsored
deportations, enslavements, shootings, and gassings. Most
189. Id. at 165.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 165-66.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 166.
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historians have rejected Daniel Goldhagen‟s thesis196 that
Germans became a nation of perpetrators because of
virulent, eliminationist anti-semitism deep in the German
character.197 They have instead documented the array of
more pedestrian pressures and motivations that led
“ordinary men” (to use Christopher Browning‟s famous
phrase)198 to tolerate and to collaborate in repression,
brutality, and murder. Intra- and inter-bureaucratic
competition, improvisation, and personal ambition figure
prominently in these accounts.199 Hannah Arendt‟s account
of the German “desk murderer” as a dull, unthinking
automaton200 has been similarly dismantled; historians now
see Adolf Eichmann and his ilk as agents creatively striving
in settings where reprehensible ideas had become
acceptable.201
Benno Martin and Karl Bendetsen were gifted at such
striving, as were many, many others on whose labors the
German
and
American
deportations
depended.
Functionaries at this level in the Nazi system were not
196. See generally DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER‟S WILLING EXECUTIONERS
(1996).
197. On the rejection of Goldhagen, see A.D. Moses, Structure and Agency in
the Holocaust: Daniel J. Goldhagen and His Critics, 37 HIST. & THEORY, May
1998, at 194, 195.
198. CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING, ORDINARY MEN: RESERVE POLICE BATTALION
101 AND THE FINAL SOLUTION IN POLAND (1993).
199. See id. (describing how a battalion of middle-aged reservists murdered
thousands of Jews); see also MARTIN BROSZAT, THE HITLER STATE: THE
FOUNDATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE THIRD REICH
359 (John W. Hiden trans., Longman Inc. 1981) (1969) (“To suggest that the
development of Nationalist Socialist policy only consisted in steering towards
and carrying out prefabricated long-term ideological aims in small doses is an
over simplification. . . . On the contrary, it took place amidst a progressive
division of power, an increasingly fragmentary process whereby particularist
power apparatuses made themselves independent and where any over-all coordination and regularity was missing.”); RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF
THE EUROPEAN JEWS (1961) (detailing Germany‟s planning and executing of the
Holocaust).
200. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 276 (1963).
201. See, e.g., CESARANI, supra note 104, at 1-17; LIPSTADT, supra note 104, at
xix.
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Robert Jackson‟s concern at Nürnberg; his attention and the
world‟s were drawn to the potentates and the zealots. That
attention was of course timely and warranted. But the
world‟s attention flagged just when things got
uncomfortably interesting—when the question became not
how a handful of extra-ordinary men functioned at the top
of a repressive system but how a lot of ordinary men ran it.
The cases of Martin and Bendetson reveal ambition as a
crucial, even if partial, explanation. The point is not that
ambition itself is inherently suspect, for in many contexts it
is an engine of healthy accomplishment, innovation, and
advancement. The point is rather that in contexts where
racial identification and isolation had become acceptable,
ambition turned toxic.
As we consider Justice Jackson‟s Nürnberg legacy and
his words at Buffalo in 1951, it should be a matter of special
discomfort to us that Benno Martin and Karl Bendetsen
were both trained in the law. Their legal education gave
them the analytical skills to solve difficult problems, but it
evidently gave them little in the way of a moral framework
for identifying unacceptable answers. Their degrees
positioned them well for professional advancement, but they
took from their training little to restrain the pull of their
ambition.202
202. It should be noted that the pull of ambition was something Robert
Jackson himself knew well, sometimes to his own discomfort or the
disadvantage of the Supreme Court itself. He absented himself from the
Supreme Court‟s 1945 Term to take up the work at Nürnberg partly out of his
desire to step out of what he called “a back eddy” so that he could be involved in
the “important things going on in the world.” Dennis J. Hutchinson, The BlackJackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203, 209. His absence only heightened the
already bitter tensions on the Court. Id. at 210. And while he was at Nürnberg,
his powerful ambition to be appointed Chief Justice upon the sudden death of
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone led him to publicize a vicious internal dispute
with his rival for the position, Associate Justice Hugo Black, that brought deep
embarrassment to the Court. See id. at 215-22; Thomas Reedy, Supreme Court
„Feud‟ Flares Openly; Jackson Denounces Black as a „Bully,‟ WASH. POST, June
11, 1946, at 1; Editorial, Twilight of the Court, CHI . DAILY TRIB., June 12, 1946,
at 20 (“[The Court] stands at the lowest ebb of dignity, capacity, and integrity in
the history of the nation, and the discredit to which it has been brought is
wholly the product of its members thru their own efforts.”); Lewis Wood,
Jackson‟s Attack on Black Stirs Talk of Court Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,
1946, at 1.
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This is a matter that concerned Eugene V. Rostow, the
former dean of Yale Law School, in 1983, when he published
a review of a book that documented the work of highranking military and civilian lawyers in crafting and
defending the exclusion and imprisonment of Japanese
Americans.203 The reviewed book, Peter Irons‟s Justice at
War,204 usefully narrated a story of infighting between and
among military and civilian attorneys and documented their
struggles over how to present a defense of the government
program to the Supreme Court in cases including
Korematsu v. United States.205 Rostow, who had published
his own path-breaking criticism of the Supreme Court‟s
Japanese American cases back in 1945,206 appreciated
Irons‟s detailed telling of the story but dissented from
Irons‟s assessment that the lawyers‟ conduct was the stuff
of scandal: “To a reader accustomed to government
procedures and those of litigation,” Rostow argued, “Irons‟
account portrays a normal episode of bureaucratic striving
and confusion, and then of adjustment.”207 Rostow did not
dispute that the “quality of the work of the lawyers
displayed during the Japanese-American internment affair”
was “lamentable,” but he saw it as calling a question about
what he termed “the intellectual weakness of our legal
culture.”208 The rebuke of legal education that emerged in
his review was sharp. What the episode revealed was that
“for the most part the formation of our lawyers is
superficial; it is training for craftsmen, not members of a
learned profession.”209 It proved itself “incapable of
mastering a new and unexpected problem on the basis of
203. Eugene V. Rostow, Shame on the Home Front, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1983,
at 5 (Book World).
204. IRONS, supra note 70.
205. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
206. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases: A Disaster, 54 YALE
L.J. 489, 492 (1945) (“[The Japanese American cases] are a breach, potentially a
major breach, in the principle of equality.”).
207. Rostow, supra note 203.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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first principles” because it “lack[ed] a firm jurisprudential
footing.”210
Rostow ended his review of Irons‟s book with words that
well fit today‟s occasion, and might have filled in the blanks
of Justice Jackson‟s 1951 address in Buffalo as well. He
wrote that:
The story of the Japanese-American internment is a cautionary
tale from which one may draw many lessons. Perhaps the most
important in the long run is that our educational system and the
learned societies and professional organizations which sponsor
and encourage intellectual efforts beyond the university must
become more demanding, more coherent, more rigorous, more
independent, and more philosophical—above all, more
211
philosophical.

By “philosophical,” I do not understand Rostow to mean
that law school should become three years of reading
Wittgenstein. I understand him to mean that the process of
teaching a person to “think like a lawyer” has to include
study of certain moral commitments that anchor the
profession and a mode of reflection that encourages
practitioners to examine their efforts for their clients
against the backdrop of those commitments.
In 1960, the great legal realist Karl Llewellyn advised
law students that their task in the first year of law school
was “to knock [their] ethics into temporary anesthesia.”212
Llewellyn intended that the anesthesia should wear off in
the second year,213 but its numbing effect has been anything
but temporary. Teaching law students to “think like a
lawyer” has, in the main, been stuck for decades in a valuefree zone.214 Stephen Wizner puts it bluntly but aptly: “To
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 101 (3d
ed. 1960).
213. Id. at 103.
214. This is not to say that the value-free approach has gone unchallenged; a
number of other approaches have been articulated. Judith Wegner‟s work has
been exemplary in this area. See Judith Welch Wegner, Reframing Legal
Education‟s “Wicked Problems,” 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 867 (2009); Judith Wegner,
Better Writing, Better Thinking: Thinking Like a Lawyer, 10 LEGAL WRITING 9
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„think like a lawyer‟ means adopting an emotionally remote,
morally neutral approach to human problems and social
issues; distancing oneself from the feelings and suffering of
others; . . . and withholding moral judgment.”215 Law
students “are now taught a process and not a purpose for
the law,” as Steve Sheppard puts it; they encounter a
“soullessness” that gives them “no coordinated and
professional sense of why the law demands what it does, or
of what the law should demand.”216
Over the years, there have been calls to modify this
emptily pragmatic conception of “thinking like a lawyer” in
favor of one that is not “value-neutral on matters of
value.”217 Stephen Wizner has been particularly forceful on
this point, urging law schools to recognize that it “[i]s . . .
possible to discourage fuzzy thinking and sentimentalism,
and to teach „abstract hypothetical-deductive critical
thinking skills,‟ while at the same time raising and
addressing moral issues and encouraging humane responses
to human experience.”218 Richard Posner, no ideological soulmate of Wizner‟s, has sketched a course syllabus that might
help students appreciate moral contours to the lawyer‟s role
in a way that pushes beyond “a careful exegesis of the
American Bar Association‟s code of professional ethics.”219
The imagined course would “bring to bear on law the
[w]estern philosophical and ethical tradition,” confronting
the student with “the ethical questions about agency and
(2004). I mean to say here simply that rival approaches have not yet had great
success at altering the prevailing definition of “thinking like a lawyer.”
215. Stephen Wizner, Is Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” Enough?, 17 YALE
L. & POL‟Y REV. 583, 587 (1998); see also Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (1975) (arguing that the roledifferentiated morality of the lawyer as a professional leads the lawyer to
amoral and even immoral conduct).
216. Steve Sheppard, Teach Justice, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599, 599-600
(2008).
217. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN
PROFESSION 203 (2000).
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218. Wizner, supra note 215, at 589.
219. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and
Scholarship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1924 (1993).
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advocacy raised by Plato in Gorgias and answered by
Aristotle in the Rhetoric”; with the works of Charles Fried
and Anthony Kronman on varying conceptions of the
lawyer‟s role; with philosophical treatments of loyalty and
candor; with depictions of lawyers in major works of
literature; with the rival understandings of the lawyer‟s role
of critical theorists, legal realists, and feminists; and, most
intriguingly for our purposes, “with the behavior of the legal
profession in crisis, for example in Nazi Germany.”220
Posner‟s draft curriculum is commendable, particularly
for his last item, a rare explicit call for the use of historical
examples of amoral lawyering as tools of professional
ethical instruction. But we can note at least a hint of the
exceptionalism in Posner‟s list that lurked in Justice
Jackson‟s thinking. The teachable example of the morally
unmoored attorney is a German lawyer, not an American, a
Benno Martin and not a Karl Bendetsen—as if the history
of the American legal profession offered up no suitable
candidates. Yet surely there are teachable examples in the
experiences of the countless American lawyers who
supported the territorial expulsion and cultural decimation
of native peoples, the enslavement of African Americans
and their subjugation and segregation once emancipated,
and the mass wartime removal and incarceration of
Japanese Americans.221

220. Id. at 1924-25. By citing Posner‟s proposed curriculum, I do not mean to
endorse the notion that legal ethics and professionalism are best taught in a
conventional reading-based seminar format. In fact, I tend to doubt that a readand-discuss approach permits students to appreciate the nature of the ethical
dilemmas they will face or to practice solving them. There is a robust discussion
in the law reviews about how best to reform our methods of teaching ethics and
professionalism; one recent and concise summary is Bruce A. Green, Teaching
Lawyers Ethics, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1091, 1092-93 (2006).
221. It should be noted that Posner would not dispute this. RICHARD A.
POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 157 (1995) (“[W]e should not suppose that our judges
have a margin of moral superiority over our political leaders greater than the
margin that the German judges of the Third Reich had over their Leader. The
United States has never had a Hitler, so it has never had a judiciary complicit
with a Hitler. But we have had slavery, and segregation, and criminal laws
against miscegenation („dishonoring the race‟), and Red Scares, and the
internment in World War II of tens of thousands of harmless Japanese-
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Sixty-six years after Justice Jackson pointed to
education as the “last clear chance of civilization to avoid
catastrophe,”222 we should resolve to study the professional
lives of bureaucrat-lawyers like Karl Bendetsen and Benno
Martin. We should use the example of their dangerous
ambition as a reminder of the need for a trumping
professional commitment to defending, among other things,
certain basic facets of human dignity, such as the right not
to be uprooted, deported, and imprisoned because of the
accident of membership in a feared or reviled group. As
Richard Weisberg concludes from his study of lawyers in the
Vichy regime, we should “step back, take individual
responsibility, and recognize that a simple declaration of
legalistic resistance to the bad belongs in our system of law,
stands a real chance of inspiring other lawyers to a similar
stance, and can often be articulated without risk of
punishment or even ostracism.”223

Americans; and most of our judges went along with these things without
protest.”).
An almost equally instructive educational example—because of the
shared foundations of our legal systems—would be the British lawyers of the
German-occupied Channel Islands who willingly implemented orders for the
registration of the islands‟ Jews and the expropriation of their property between
1940 and 1945. See DAVID FRASER, THE JEWS OF THE CHANNEL ISLANDS AND THE
RULE OF LAW, 1940-1945 (2000).
222. Jackson, supra note 1, at 284.
223. Richard Weisberg, The Hermeneutic of Acceptance and the Discourse of
the Grotesque, with a Classroom Exercise on Vichy Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
1875, 1895-96 (1996).

